The Greater Horn of Africa is on the brink of a devastating polycrisis, a perfect storm of interconnected challenges that threaten the region's stability and the well-being of its people. This looming catastrophe is not merely a collection of isolated issues but a complex web of factors that, when combined, could have catastrophic consequences. As an expert in famine, conflict, and humanitarian crises, I find this situation particularly intriguing and concerning, as it highlights the intricate relationship between climate, politics, and human resilience.
One of the most immediate concerns is the impact of the El Niño phenomenon. The super El Niño currently forming is expected to bring both drought and flooding to the Greater Horn region, affecting agriculture, livestock, and water availability. This is particularly concerning for the eastern Greater Horn, where the short rains were already below average in 2025, and the long rains in 2026 are projected to be well below normal. The northern Horn, including Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Sudan, is also at risk, with below-average rainfall expected in these heavily populated areas. The potential for population displacement and the loss of livelihoods is immense, and the region's already fragile food security could be severely compromised.
What makes this situation even more complex is the ongoing war in Iran. The conflict has led to significant increases in transportation and food costs, and the fertilizer shortage caused by the war is projected to reduce harvests later in the year. This will not only keep food prices high but also affect the region's agricultural productivity. The Horn of Africa, which typically relies on regional surplus-producing areas to stabilize prices, will be doubly affected by this bottleneck, leading to reduced opportunities for agricultural work and increased expenses for food laborers, who are among the poorest in the region.
The situation is further complicated by the unpredictable Ebola variant that has taken hold in Congo and Uganda. While it has not yet spread to the rest of the region, the concern is that if it does, it will not only add a major epidemic risk but also make the response to other shocks more difficult. The combination of climate, market, and epidemic shocks is not simply additive but multiplicative, with each intensifying the other. Climate and epidemic shocks almost inevitably exacerbate conflict and encourage crackdowns on population movements, creating a vicious cycle.
The region's protracted and violent conflicts are another critical factor. All the countries in the Greater Horn, except Kenya, are experiencing prolonged civil wars, with multiple parties jockeying for power and military advantage. This makes the task of dealing with the impact of climate, health, and price shocks much harder and risks further exacerbating or accelerating individual drivers. Regional analysts have warned of an uptick in violence in Ethiopia and South Sudan, and the risk of famine or the threat of famine has already been noted in several countries in the region. The war in Iran, outside the region, is also complicating matters, leading to increased transportation and food costs and a fertilizer shortage that will affect harvests and food prices.
The deliberate gutting of the global humanitarian response infrastructure has further undermined the region's ability to cope with the looming crisis. The closure of USAID and major cuts in spending on foreign aid have weakened the international system's capacity to respond to major shocks. Combined with longer-term political and governance challenges in eastern Africa, this conjunction of existing and anticipated factors in the Horn of Africa risks both further displacement and a rise in mortality. Aid groups and regional bodies have called for higher levels of funding, but more money alone cannot solve this problem. Humanitarian programs have been shut down, staff laid off, and infrastructure sold, leaving local communities and organizations to bear the brunt of the crisis.
However, there is a glimmer of hope in the form of local mutual aid efforts. Since the collapse of the international aid system, long-standing efforts by local communities and organizations have ramped up significantly and effectively. These initiatives are typically self-managed and financed through their own networks and diaspora remittances. But given the size of budget cuts in the formal humanitarian response system, these local initiatives can be better supported with complementary funding. Intermediary organizations have emerged to support this effort, and more flexible public policies, such as easing restrictions on banking transfers, can enable more effective diaspora support. Donors and the U.N. can also ensure that greater proportions of funding in the formal global humanitarian system go to local initiatives.
Fundamentally, the most worrisome driver behind this polycrisis is violent conflict. The civil wars and ongoing insurgencies in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia have been dragging on for years and have drawn in more countries, either directly through financial support and weapons sales or indirectly through political support. Not only does violent conflict complicate any response to crisis, but it also raises the risk of starvation being used as a weapon of war, as already alleged in Sudan and the Tigray region of Ethiopia. The international community has been unwilling to hold warring parties and their foreign supporters accountable for intentionally starving parts of their populations.
Finally, data and monitoring systems have been significantly crippled by aid cuts and misinformation, making it difficult to understand the gravity of these crises or to keep actors accountable. Improved monitoring and evidence, including evidence of atrocities and the use of starvation as a weapon, need to be supported if there is to be effective assistance and accountability. The conjunction of so many potential hazards has all the hallmarks of the proverbial perfect storm. Not only will people's access to adequate food be devastated, but it will also affect civilian protection, access, and mobility. Without immediate prevention measures, the looming polycrisis will have widespread impacts on basic health, nutrition, and water services, with the potential for mass mortality and displacement.
In conclusion, the Greater Horn of Africa is facing a polycrisis that is not merely a collection of isolated issues but a complex web of factors that, when combined, could have catastrophic consequences. As an expert, I find this situation particularly fascinating and concerning, as it highlights the intricate relationship between climate, politics, and human resilience. The region's ability to cope with the looming crisis will depend on the support of local communities, organizations, and flexible public policies, as well as the willingness of the international community to hold warring parties and their foreign supporters accountable for their actions. The perfect storm is upon us, and the time to act is now.
